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Metrics and the Measurement of International Trade:
Some Thoughts on the Early Operation of the WTO RTA Transparency Mechanism
By Chi Carmody1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization2 (“WTO Agreement”) is often
said to be about “trade”, but this is only partly true. Nothing in the WTO Agreement
obliges countries to perform specific amounts of trade. Rather, the WTO Agreement is
about the trade-related behaviour of WTO member governments.
The foregoing statements are an indication of the WTO Agreement’s principle of “indirect
effect”3 and the way in which the treaty’s legal system works at one remove to achieve its
aims. They also emphasize a basic tension in the agreement between deductive reasoning
based on an abstract model and inductive reasoning based on empiric observation. The
tension is manifested in evidentiary terms in the treaty’s use of presumptions and
requirements of proof. In many instances WTO law simply assumes a state of affairs; in
other instances it demands real evidence.4
One subject of coverage in the WTO Agreement which demands evidence is regional trade
agreements (RTAs). RTAs are regarded as a means of achieving further multilateral
integration but also pose the threat of trade diversion. In other words, their potential to
contribute to the broader aims of the global trading system is tempered by the ever-present
“reality” that they may divert trade away from it.5 Consequently, the central provision of
the WTO Agreement which deals with RTAs, Art. XXIV, demands proof of the magnitude
of any such regional agreement as a means of assessing what the potential for trade
diversion is. Likewise, many of the unanswered questions in Art. XXIV jurisprudence can
1
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“It may, thus, be convenient in the GATT/WTO legal order to speak not of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of indirect
effect.” United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, para. 7.78 (Dec. 22, 1999).
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Perhaps the best-known presumption in WTO law is that found in DSU Art. 3.8 which states that “In cases where there is an
infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other
Members parties to that covered agreement.” For evidence-based requirements see for example Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, para. 162-164 (Jan. 10, 2001) (“determination of whether a measure determination of
whether a measure, which is not ‘indispensable’, may nevertheless be ‘necessary’ within the contemplation of Article XX(d), involves in
every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of factors which prominently include the contribution made by the compliance
measure to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or values protected by that law or
regulation, and the accompanying impact of the law or regulation on imports or exports.”). Evidentiary requirements can also be found in
ADA Arts. 3.4 (impact examination to include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices”), 3.5 (causal relationship
determination “shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authority”), Annex II (determinations permissible on
the basis of facts available), 5.3, 5.8 and 6 (accuracy and adequacy of evidence, and opportunity to present), 10.7 (sufficiency of evidence)
and 11.2 (evidence required for revocation). See also US – Softwood Lumber, B.I.S.D. 40th Supp. 358, para. 332; US – DRAM, para. 6.43;
Mexico - HFCS, para. 7.97, Guatemala – Cement I, para. 7.77; US – Hot Rolled Steel, para. 7.153; SCM Arts. 4.2, 11 and 12, CVA Art.
8.3, and Annex 1; SPS Art. 3.3 (scientific justification) and EC – Hormones, para. 184; PSA Art. 2.2 (evidentiary standards for price
verifications); DSU Art. 26.1 (detailed justification in support of non-violation claims).
5
GATT Art. XXIV:4 refers to this dual concern in the following language: “The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing
freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties
to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between
the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.”
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be seen as attempts to grapple with probative, and therefore essentially empiric, questions.
For instance, the requirement that upon the formation of a customs union trade restrictions
“shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the
duties … prior to the formation of such union”6, or that countries contemplating such a
union shall provide “compensatory adjustment” to their trading partners7, are essentially
questions of measurement. Whether or not the countries which have entered into an RTA
have answered them are at the core of what disputes over the application of Art. XXIV are
about.
In recent years the number of these disputes has increased as the number of RTAs has
grown. By November 2007 385 RTAs had been notified to the WTO, 197 of which were in
force. Of the agreements in force, 125 had been notified under GATT Art. XXIV, 22 under
the Enabling Clause and 50 under GATS Art. V.8 These numbers virtually guarantee that
questions of proof – and competing ones of presumption - will remain at the forefront of
consideration of the role of RTAs in the WTO system in years to come. The main issue is
whether countries will continue to insist on proof concerning the questions referred to
above, or whether they will be content to presume that RTAs are a necessary part of trade
liberalization. Arguably, the stalemate that has evolved over the approval of RTAs under
GATT and the WTO Agreement can be taken to be a sign that while countries are de jure
committed to measurement and metrifying the impact of RTAs, a de facto presumption
exists in WTO law that RTAs are useful.
The WTO’s much-vaunted dispute settlement system has only been able cast some light on
these questions. Case law furnishes indications about the bare legal requirements for an
RTA, yet decisions have not been able to resolve the issue whether individual RTAs
comply with the WTO Agreement. Indeed, in Turkey – Textiles the panel maintained that
“it is arguable” that panels do not have the jurisdiction to do so.9 What current experience
points to, then, is a need for some means of assessing the compatibility of RTAs with the
WTO Agreement.
Provisional approval of an RTA Transparency Mechanism (TM) by the WTO membership
on December 14, 2006 is a step in that direction and raises important questions as to why
the TM is necessary, what specific functions it is designed to serve, and whether it moves
the debate about proof-versus-presumption forward.10 Briefly stated, the TM seeks to
promote transparency – that is, “the quality of being evident or discernible to external
sources”11 - about the operation of RTAs by building a database of information concerning
them and thereby making comparison between them more straightforward. The hope is that
clearer information will eventually allow the development of benchmarks against which
fulfillment of the requirements of Art. XXIV can be measured.
6
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It is too early to pass judgment on the TM’s success or failure. However, the preliminary
indications are not encouraging. So far the Mechanism has experienced a number of
“teething problems”12 and WTO reports refer to “delays in the receipt of statistical data,
data discrepancies in member submissions and delays in receipt of comments from the
parties.”13 This record has undermined one of the most notable attributes of the new
Mechanism – speed – and required the consideration of several RTAs to be postponed.
While not stated openly, an unspoken fear seems to be growing that the TM may become
an ineffectual appendage of the WTO system, essentially replicating experience with the
WTO Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM).14
A reading of the minutes of the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA)
also suggests that a careful dance is taking place as countries become accustomed to the
TM provisions and warily reveal information about the RTAs they have entered into. TM
Art. 10 provides that nothing in the Secretariat’s collection of information – known as a
‘factual presentation’ – “shall be used as a basis for dispute settlement procedures or to
create new rights and obligations for [WTO] Members”, but the behaviour of countries
betrays a different attitude: one of watchfulness and apprehension. No country appears
willing to ‘bare it all’ or, at any rate, to acknowledge the conclusions that information
gathered under the TM might suggest – at least not yet.15
This article is therefore focused on what the TM is, what early experience with it has been,
and what functions it could serve in future. Current developments infer that there will soon
come a time when a need to use the information being gathered by the TM will arise, and
this, in turn, raises the question of how customs unions and free trade agreements are to be
analyzed. Methodologies will have to be developed. At the same time, a purely quantitative
approach to the task seems to be at odds with the evolving understanding of Art. XXIV.
New methods of analysis, possibly inspired by techniques of regulatory impact assessment
(RIA), may be more appropriate.
This article is divided into four parts. Following the Introduction, Part II deals with the
RTA Transparency Mechanism and its requirements. Part III provides a summary of
experience with the TM to date. Part IV examines the development of alternatives to
quantification by examining the experience of regulatory impact assessment in Canada and
other countries.16 This experience may be relevant to operation of the TM in future. Finally,
Part V offers a brief conclusion.
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II. THE WTO RTA TRANSPARENCY MECHANISM
The WTO TM is designed to enhance the transparency of information concerning RTAs.
Contrary to what might be expected, however, the TM is not the first attempt to promote
transparency in GATT or the WTO Agreement concerning RTAs. A 1996 Note by the
WTO Secretariat observed that in early GATT practice parties to RTAs notified under Art.
XXIV furnished specific information requested by GATT working parties, but apparently
little more.17 The Note goes on to observe that this ad hoc approach led to a lack of
consistency in the reporting procedure, something which prompted the GATT Contracting
Parties to adopt a Decision in 1971 establishing a calendar of fixed dates for the biennial
examination of existing RTAs.18 The 1971 Decision failed to eliminate all of the
shortcomings concerning this issue:
Biennial reports on regional agreements in accordance with the
1971 Decision were regularly received until 1986. From the early 1980s,
however, there was very little discussion of the reports in the meetings of
the GATT Council of Representatives, and as of 1987, no reports have been
received on agreements notified under Article XXIV.19
In 1994 a further attempt at transparency was introduced in the form of the Understanding
on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, which was agreed to as part of the WTO
Agreement.20 Nevertheless, the wording of the Understanding is only slightly more formal
and precise that what existed previously and in practice did little to solve Art. XXIV’s
problems.
The TM is the latest attempt to deal with these problems. It has five principal features:
1. early announcement of RTA negotiations
2. notification of concluded RTAs
3. consideration of RTAs through the WTO Secretariat’s preparation of a “factual
presentation” on each RTA
4. subsequent notification and reporting
5. recordkeeping
Perhaps the most salient feature of the new RTA TM is its stated emphasis on
transparency, a value that lies at the core of contemporary governance theory. In an age of
accountability, transparency has come to be regarded as a chief attribute of good
17
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Checklist of Points on Reporting on the Operation of Regional Agreements: Note by the Secretariat, WT/REG/W/3, para. 2 (20 June
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The 1994 Understanding stated that notifications made under Art. XXIV:7(a) shall be examined by a CRTA Working Party, which
“shall submit a report to the [WTO] Council for Trade in Goods on its findings”. The Council is then left to “make such recommendations
to Members as it deems appropriate.” These may include recommendations in respect of interim agreements on the proposed time-frame
for phase-in of the RTA and “on measures required to complete the formation of the customs union or free-trade area.” It also requires
notification of “substantial changes” in the plan and schedule of interim RTAs and observes that “parties shall not maintain or put into
force, as the case may be, such [interim] agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations.” It
also requires that with respect to completed RTAs “[a]ny significant changes and/or developments in the agreements should be reported as
they occur.” A useful document on notification requirements is The Technical Cooperation Handbook on Notification Requirements,
WT/TC/NOTIF/REG/1 (9 Sept. 1996).
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governance. Definitions of good governance confirm the point. They can be found in the
work of the World Bank, which is the originating source of good governance theory21, as
well as in the European Commission, which has determined that the principles of good
governance can be summarized as values of openness, participation, accountability,
effectiveness and coherence. The former United Nations Human Rights Commission (now
the United Nations Human Rights Council) likewise has identified five attributes of good
governance: transparency, responsibility, accountability, participation and responsiveness.
In each definition above what becomes abundantly clear is that transparency is the first
virtue of good governance. Thought about carefully, it is not hard to imagine why.
Transparency involves the dissemination of information so that appraisal and decisionmaking can take occur. Without it, other governance values will not be realized.
Transparency is therefore a pre-condition or requirement for virtually all other aspects
of good governance.
The law of a number of domestic and international organizations recognizes this necessity
and attempts to promote it. In the European Union, for instance, the first article of the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that the “Treaty marks a new state of creating an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as
possible.”22 Pursuant to TEU Art. 255 the European Parliament and the Council have
adopted regulations on public access to Council and Commission documents, and the
European Court of Justice has dealt with a number of cases alleging violation of
transparency requirements in the EU context.23 Nevertheless, commentators have also
observed that the European Court has not elevated transparency to the status of “a general
principle of EC law”.24
In context of the WTO Agreement transparency refers to the openness of each WTO
member, and more specifically, to making sure that information provided by each member
is “evident and discernible” to the rest of the WTO membership. Experience under GATT
and the WTO indicates that this has not always been the case in relation to RTAs.
There is no generalized requirement transparency or notification in either GATT or the
WTO Agreement. Instead, the WTO Agreement features a number of individual
transparency obligations tailored to specific circumstances. Thus, GATT Art. X:1 speaks of
the obligation upon countries to publish trade-related legislation “promptly in such a
manner as to enable governments and traders to become acquainted with them” but also
provides that the obligation does “not require any contracting party to disclose confidential
information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary to the public
interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises,
21
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public or private.” The parallel provision in GATS is GATS Art. III and IIIbis. A number
of cases in GATT and WTO dispute settlement have also dealt with the extent to which
countries as well as “individuals and bodies” have to disclose certain information.25
In GATT Art. XXIV countries are obliged to fulfill the terms of GATT Art. XXIV:7(a)
regarding disclosure of RTA arrangements as follows:
7.
(a)
Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union
or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such
a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and
shall make available to them such information regarding the proposed union
or area as will enable them to make such reports and recommendations to
contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.26
This notification is supplemented by the 1996 Standard Format for Information on
Regional Trade Agreements, which is designed “to facilitate and standardize the provision
of initial information by parties to regional trade agreements.”27 The 1996 Standard Format
is, however, purely voluntary and therefore highlights a number of features in the WTO’s
institutional culture that make it difficult to expect complete transparency in relation to
RTAs.
To begin with, the membership of the WTO is large and varied. In April 2008 it was
composed of 151 members, a majority of which are developing countries.28 While all WTO
members share many common obligations there are many individualized obligation as well,
and although progress has been made in recent years in standardizing WTO reporting
requirements, it can be difficult to determine exactly how countries have implemented their
concessions and commitments. In addition, the staff of the WTO Secretariat remains
relatively small and is required to maintain its neutrality and impartiality at all times. This
means that it can only provide limited assistance in the task of clarifying national
concessions and commitments. Instead, the work of doing so is often left to WTO
Committees and the TPRM which operate by means of question-and-answer sessions that
diplomats can easily evade or delay. This structure betrays an institutional culture of
passivity. Unlike other, more assertive international organizations like the EU,29 the WTO
membership remains firmly in the driver’s seat. Formally, there is very little that can be
done to compel a country to do something in WTO law, including disclosure of the full
terms of its participation in an RTA.
What these observations translate into in practice is that GATT Art. XXIV:7(a) has - and
can be - interpreted loosely. From the bare text it is not clear at what point “deciding to
enter into a customs union or free trade area” foresees, and therefore countries have argued
See for instance United States – Shrimp, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 104 (Oct. 6, 1998) and Canada – Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, para. 185
(Aug. 2, 1999).
26
Emphasis added.
27
WT/REG/W/6 (15 August 1996).
28
Ukraine’s terms of accession were announced on February 5, 2008 and must be ratified by July 4, 2008. Ukraine will become the 152
member of the WTO 30 days after ratification.
29
Reference is made here to various legal actions possible by the European Commission, the European Council, the European Parliament,
other bodies and individuals which have the effect of providing an internal system of checks and balances within the Union.
25
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about whether it means at the outset of negotiations or just prior to their conclusion. In
addition, the term “shall promptly notify” is the subject of some ambiguity since some
countries have waited considerable time before notifying either the text or any
modifications of an RTA, meaning that effective review by the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements is stymied. A final concern with Art. XXIV:7(a) is that the bare
requirement of prompt notification, when combined with the voluntary nature of the 1996
Standard Format, says very little about exactly what should be notified, an omission which
has led over time to incomplete or inconsistent notification of different agreements. This
practice deprives third parties of the ability to compare, and therefore to meaningfully
challenge, what is being notified, and may even contribute to the institutional culture of
passivity referred to above.
The Preamble to the TM recognizes that RTAs “have greatly increased in number and have
become an important element in Members’ trade policies and developmental strategies”
and that the Mechanism is to apply to GATT Art. XXIV, GATS Art. V and the 1979
Enabling Clause. In the case of notifications under GATT and GATS, implementation of
the TM is left to the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, while notifications under
paragraph 2(c) of the Enabling Clause (involving RTAs between developing countries) are
left to the Committee on Trade and Development.
An initial attribute of the TM is that it attempts to reinforce the notification obligation by
moving the relevant notification dates forward. Under the TM countries that are
considering forming an RTA must now report their discussions to the WTO at the outset
and keep it reasonably apprised during the course of negotiations.30 This is the “early
announcement” component of the intensified obligation.
Second, under the existing wording of Art. XXIV:7(a) countries entering into an RTA are
required to “promptly notify” the WTO membership. What “promptly notify” means is, as
mentioned, unclear. The TM therefore requires that when the RTA is signed, information
about conclusion of the final agreement is to be provided “as early as possible”.31 This is
the “final announcement” component of the obligation.
The third group of requirements relates to the provision and use of information. The most
significant change is with respect to the format that the information is to be provided in.
Countries are to submit a standard set of information on their RTAs, which is collected by
the Secretariat and made available in an electronic database. Over time this requirement
should enhance comparability.
What becomes clear is that the WTO Secretariat is given a more pronounced role in the
collection and dissemination of this information. Under TM para. 7(b) the Secretariat is
now required to prepare an “unbiased factual presentation” about the proposed RTA with
the information submitted by the parties, something which should provide a greater degree
of neutrality and objectivity to WTO decision-making. An Annex sets out required data on
the subject of tariff concessions, MFN duty rates, product-specific preferences, and import
30
31
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TM Art. 3.
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statistics for the most recent three years preceding the notification. In respect of services,
substantially similar data is required, a formulation necessitated by the fact that such
information may be difficult to obtain in relation to intangibles.
The delicacy of the task entrusted to the WTO Secretariat is underlined in TM para. 9,
which states that “the factual presentation … shall be primarily based on the information
provided by the parties; if necessary, the WTO Secretariat may also use data available from
other sources, taking into account the views of the parties in furtherance of factual
accuracy.” It adds that “[i]n preparing the factual presentation, the WTO Secretariat shall
refrain from any value judgment.” It also indicates that “[t]he WTO Secretariat’s factual
presentation shall not be used as a basis for dispute settlement procedures or to create new
rights and obligations.”
Fourth, the TM also clarifies a number of process-related obligations. The TM attempts to
avoid styming of the consideration process by ensuring that “the timing of the data
submission shall not exceed ten weeks – or 20 weeks in the case of RTAs involving only
developing countries – after the date of the notification of the agreement.”32 Once
notification has taken place and the factual presentation has been prepared, the TM
mandates that the “RTA shall be considered by Members under the procedures established”
in TM paras. 6 – 13. This consideration of the RTA by the WTO membership shall
normally be concluded in the period of a year following notification.
To further minimize any potential for delay, the meeting that is to consider the notified
RTA is to be a “single” formal event, although how much attention should be paid to this is
probably debatable than real given that astute trade diplomats can potentially meet on an
informal basis indefinitely.
Fifth, coupled with the above are obligations that arise as to notification and reporting upon
any changes to a previously notified RTA. For instance, in the case of “a change affecting
the implementation of an RTA”, the change triggering notification is defined inter alia as
“modifications to the preferential treatment … and to the RTAs disciplines”.33 It is also
noteworthy that in TM para. 15 concerning the end of the RTA’s implementation period
the parties are required to submit to the WTO a short written report on the realization of the
liberalization commitments in the RTA that was the subject of the original notification.
This synopsis is to be distributed to the WTO membership, as are periodic updates.
The TM is neither comprehensive nor permanent. TM Arts. 22-23 specify that the TM
“shall apply, on a provisional basis, to all RTAs” and that the WTO membership will
review and replace it in light of experience with a permanent mechanism adopted as part of
the results of the Doha Round.
III. EXPERIENCE UNDER THE TM
Experience with the TM so far has been mixed. Although the EC representative has
32
33
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described the first year of the Mechanism as “successful”34, comments made both by the
CRTA Chairman and other countries display a sense of unease at what is unfolding. It is
clear that the TM places a certain burden on the WTO Secretariat to prepare factual
presentations, but even more to the point, countries themselves are required to comment
upon and question the Secretariat’s work and they have not always done so promptly.
In summary, the 2007 Draft Report of the CRTA reveals that prior to the adoption of the
TM, the Committee had completed the factual examination of a total of 67 agreements, of
which 46 were in the area of trade in goods and 21 in trade in services. During 2007, the
Secretariat distributed factual presentations of 13 RTAs, 11 of which were used as the basis
for RTAs' consideration in the CRTA. Seventeen RTAs are scheduled for consideration;
factual presentations of these RTAs are currently under preparation. There is a remaining
backlog of 64 RTAs, comprised of 36 RTAs for which the factual presentation is still to be
done and 28 RTAs for which the factual presentation is on hold.35
The foregoing numbers may appear impressive, but in the final CRTA meeting of 2007 the
Chairman noted that progress was slow: only two (of a projected 11) were on the agenda of
the meeting, with the rest having been rescheduled for 2008. A number of difficulties have
arise with the TM’s process: some Members continue to have problems respecting
deadlines for data submission and in some cases the format and quality of data received had
not been as expected.
An illustration of some specific problems is apparent from minutes of the final CRTA
meeting. Thus, for the EFTA-Tunisia goods agreement the Secretariat had sent the draft
factual presentation to the parties, although the data for Iceland and Tunisia was still
incomplete. The Secretariat was awaiting comments from Tunisia on the factual
presentation which had been sent to it in July 2007. For the India-Singapore goods and
services agreement the factual presentation had been drafted but the Secretariat had
encountered a problem with India's tariff and was awaiting clarification from the Indian
authorities. For the Japan-Mexico goods and services agreement the Secretariat had
received tariff data from both Parties, although there was some data missing in the tariff of
Japan. The Secretariat had received import data from Mexico but was still missing trade
data from Japan. For the Panama-El Salvador goods and services agreement the Secretariat
had received data that was not coherent and was liaising with the Parties for clarification.
For Turkey-Tunisia goods agreement the Secretariat had received data from Turkey but
was still awaiting the tariff phase down from Tunisia.
These details reveal a number of specific problems with the TM’s operation. First, there is
the fact that the deadline for submission of replies to questions is nowhere spelled out.
Countries can delay the TM process simply by refusing to reply.36 Second, there is the
34

Note on the Meeting of 29 November 2007, WT/REG/M/48 para. 14 (9 Jan. 2008).
The WTO Secretariat is also required to prepare a factual abstract for those RTAs for which the CRTA had concluded the factual
examination by 31 December 2006 and for RTAs notified to the WTO under the Enabling Clause. As of mid-Nov. 2007 eight factual
abstracts were prepared and placed on the WTO website; 30 were still awaiting comments from the parties, and the remaining 39 were
under preparation.
36
A number of questions associated with this issue have been canvassed in the CRTA, such as when discussion of an RTA can be
considered completed and what ultimately completion means. The U.S. has suggested that the conclusion of the meeting should simply
mean “that there was no need for a further meeting and deadlines were provided for receipt of questions and replies.” Note on the Meeting
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potential for overlap in factual presentations on both goods and services, and the need to do
duplicate presentations for each. The U.S., in particular, has expressed concern in this
regard given “the distinctiveness of the obligations and of the facts [that need] to be
maintained.”37 Third and perhaps most importantly, there is the use that might be made of
the information being provided. For instance, Canada has cautioned “against thinking about
additions which might depart from the more factual elements of a database to other
information that might put [WTO] Members in a slightly uncomfortable position given the
legal rules that applied to Members’ obligations on RTAs.”38 Fourth, it remains to be seen
how the Mechanism is to deal with the measurement of RTAs between WTO and nonWTO members as well as disciplines in many new RTAs such as those involving
investment, environmental protection and human rights that formally fall outside of the
WTO Agreement’s scope of coverage. A final issue concerns what review under the TM
signifies: transparency or simply the fact that the RTA has been reviewed? No clear answer
has been given yet to this question.39
In light of all of the above, it remains difficult to see how the TM will accelerate the
WTO’s approval of RTAs and therefore provide the WTO system with any real benefit.
Most evidently, the TM does not require actual approval of notified agreements. It simply
promotes transparency in the notifications made.
IV. REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
Experience with the TM to date suggests a need to look elsewhere for inspiration as to how
the Mechanism might be made more effective. There is evidently the issue of compelling
countries to cooperate with the TM’s requirements by reporting in a timely, transparent and
accurate fashion. If current behaviour continues, it may be necessary for the WTO
Secretariat to become involved in a more assertive way by collecting “data available from
other sources” as contemplated in TM Art. 9. This could take the form of assembling
material publicly disclosed by parties, or by collecting information made available to other
international organizations, third countries and NGOs. However, such an approach would
be unlikely to resolve the deeper issue of RTA approval. That can only be done by
countries.
Attention also needs to be given to how the obligations in Art. XXIV might be creatively
re-interpreted away from a largely quantitative analysis. Given that most of the information
to be collected by the TM is of a quantitative nature, and given the problems that
of 14-15 May 2007, WT/REG/M/46 para. 46 (12 June 2007).
37
Note on the Meeting of 14-15 May 2007, WT/REG/M/46 para. 14 (12 June 2007).
38
Note on the Meeting of 14-15 May 2007, WT/REG/M/46 para. 25 (12 June 2007).
39
See discussion in Note on the Meeting of 14-15 May 2007, WT/REG/M/46 para. 25 (12 June 2007). In addition, there is the issue of
backlog. As of Nov. 2007 there were some 48 notified RTAs for which factual presentations must be prepared. Second, there are existing
agreements from the period 1987-1994 when no reports were received and which were therefore not subject to any transparency
provisions. In that case, the compromise agreed to among countries is not to subject them to any more procedures in the CRTA, but to
have a brief abstract prepared by the WTO Secretariat. The United States has indicated that it looks forward to more transparency in these
agreements and to holding consultations on them because “some are of great importance such as NAFTA”. Note on the Meeting of 14
March 2007, WT/REG/M/45 para. 24 (30 April 2007). TM Art. 22(a) specifies that RTAs for which a working party report has been
adopted by the GATT Council and those notified under the Enabling Clause will be subject to subsequent notification requirements. TM
Art. 22(b) specifies that RTAs for which the CRTA has concluded the “factual examination” prior to the TM and those notified under the
Enabling Clause will be subject to subsequent notification requirements. TM Art. 22 (c) specifies that any RTA notified prior to the
adoption of the TM and not referred to in either 22(a)-(b) will be subject to full transparency obligations under the Mechanism.
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metrification can cause in terms of estimation and “bottom-line” thinking, alternative
measures of market openness will need to be developed. The question remains how to do
so.
One possible way forward is the use of methods developed in regulatory impact assessment
(RIA). An RIA is defined by the OECD as “an analytical and systematic approach to
regulation encompassing a range of tools and techniques aimed at assessing the impacts of
regulation.”40 The genesis of RIA lies in the realization that regulation can impose costs at
the same time as it generates efficiencies. A 2007 OECD report notes that “[m]ost OECD
countries rely on RIA to help ensure development of efficient and effective regulation and
reduce the burden of regulation.” Although an underlying consideration in a welldeveloped and comprehensive RIA is to identify regulations which minimize trade
restrictiveness, in practice the trade restrictiveness of new regulations is rarely measured
explicitly, if it is identified at all.
Such consideration is timely given renewed interest over the past 18 months by the US and
EU in developing ways to include international trade impacts in regulatory reviews. In
November 2007 the US and EU made a pledge to work together in this respect in a joint
paper released in the context of the Transatlantic Economic Dialogue (TED). Later, in
February 2008 U.S. and European business groups submitted detailed recommendations on
the paper with the aim of revising and strengthening the ability of the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the EU’s Impact Assessment Board (IAB) “to rein in
regulations by other agencies seen as damaging international trade.”41 The proposals are
controversial with citizens groups, which regard them as “dangerous to public welfare,
because they could be used … to ambush environmental and safety regulations with the
argument that they could impede trade.”42 It appears that the OMB and the European
Commission are discussing possible regulatory harmonization and the inclusion of
international trade impacts in regulatory reviews. This could result in a joint communiqué
on the matter in May 2008.
The possibility of focusing on trade impacts appears to run counter to current trends in RIA
conduct. Contemporary RIA features both “quantitative and qualitative components”, as
seen in Turkey – Textiles.43 Indeed, the November 2007 US/EU paper proposes three steps
for measuring international trade impacts, only one of which is presumptively quantitative:
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1. demonstrating the need for a regulation that might impede trade;
2. measuring the degree that foreign and domestic businesses are affected, and
3. looking at international best practices for handling the issue subject to regulation.
A 2006 analysis of current trends in RIA reveals that there are five main analytical methods
used by top RIA performing countries:
1. forms of benefit-cost analysis (BCA), integrated impact analysis (IIA) and
sustainability impact analysis (SIA) to combine issues into broad analytical
frameworks that can demonstrate links and trade-offs among multiple policy
objectives;
2. forms of cost-effectiveness analysis based on comparison of alternatives to find
lowest cost solutions to produce specific outcomes;
3. a range of “partial” analyses such as Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) tests,
administrative burden estimates, business impact tests and other analyses of effects
on specified groups and stemming from certain kinds of regulatory costs;
4. risk assessment aimed at characterizing the probability of outcomes a result of
specified inputs
5. various forms of sensitivity or uncertainty analysis that project the likelihood of a
range of possible outcomes due to estimation errors. Uncertainty analysis is used to
provide policymakers with a more accurate understanding of the likelihood of
impacts.44
The same report notes that “[t]he economics thrust of RIA has always favoured benefit-cost
analysis (BCA) as the most inclusive and socially responsible method of public decisionmaking.”45 The reason for this is that economics offers the important advantage of
comparing costs and benefits occurring at different points in time. BCA is the method used
by governments to assess investment projects such as roads and dams, and was adapted to
more general regulatory policy issues in the 1970s. It is also the preferred method for
regulatory assessment used by the U.S. since 1981 and by Canada since 1992.
Nevertheless, traditional concern about the “over-monetization of impacts”46 means that
mainstream BCA analysis is of a “soft” form “in which quantitative and qualitative metrics
are combined and presented systematically.” Scott Jacobs states that “[t]here is no country
in which modern BCA insists on the monetization of all benefits and costs …”. Instead, he
notes that “critics of BCA in RIA usually ignore this fact in favour of an exaggerated and
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theoretical version of BCA that lends itself to caricature.”47 Today:
BCA is the method best adapted to protecting a broad range of interests.
One of the key advantages of benefit-cost frameworks is that they
encompass the broadest range of impacts across the social-economicenvironmental spectrum, hence they are line with nearly universal political
demands that RIA methods address a wider range of public interests. In
response, RIA methods are embracing more and more impacts, including
operational, capital, and dynamic costs, and all major benefits using
methods based on social welfare theory.48
At the same time, soft BCA has been questioned - if not challenged - in recent years by
various types of partial analyses, which consist of fragmenting RIA among various kinds of
subjects to look at different impacts. As Jacobs observes, “the increase in partial analysis is
not … any reasoned dissatisfaction with [soft BCA] … [but rather the fact] that RIA is
entering the mainstream of policy, and is coming under pressure from the many groups
who now understand that they have a stake in RIA.” Consequently, soft BCA is evolving
from “a technocratic tool of general interest” to a “political and policy tool with
constituency group impacts.”49 The outcome is a politicization of the RIA process.
Different assessment fragment “into smaller, competing analyses.” Jacobs concludes that:
[u]nfortunately, in more and more countries, use of partial analyses, driven
by competitiveness issues and, in part by political intent to serve vocal
constituencies, has actually resulted in fragmentation into competing policy
agendas, because the larger integrated framework is not clearly defined or
emphasized.50
How might experience with RIA be assimilated into the WTO’s TM? Two recent
harmonization directives introduced by the Government of Canada provide some ideas for
an answer. In 2007 the federal government issued the Cabinet Directive on Streamlining
Regulation (CDSR), which was followed by the Treasury Board’s release of Guidelines on
International Regulatory Obligations and Cooperation (“the Guidelines”).51 Both are aimed
at “managers, functional specialists, and regulatory staff” and are supposed to clarify
expectations of the Treasury Board Secretariat when it exercises its “challenge” function –
that is, the ability to question, and if necessary postpone, the introduction of new
regulations. It is not hard to analogize this function to what is supposed to happen under the
TM in its assessment of notified RTAs.
The Guidelines reveal that the overall goal is to “encourage greater regulatory compatibility
[with international regulations] when it can provide the greatest overall benefits to
Canadians.”52 In doing so, the Guidelines state that Canadian federal departments and
47

Ibid.
Jacobs, p. 35.
49
Ibid.
50
Jacobs, p. 36.
51
Cabinet Directive on Streamlining Regulation [hereinafter CDSR] and the Guidelines on International Regulatory Obligations and
Cooperation [hereinafter Guidelines], both available at www.regulation.gc.ca (site visited March 23, 2008).
52
Guidelines, p. 1.
48

14
agencies must undertake to meet international regulatory obligations and cooperation
requirements … in ways that maintain public confidence in the Canadian regulatory
system.”
The goal of regulatory compatibility “with key international counterparts” is to allow the
government of Canada to “reach policy goals more readily … with lower costs to the
government and to Canadians ….”. It also makes possible “compliance with applicable
international treaty law and its implementation in Canada” through “access to regulatory
resources of international bodies and other countries” and “allow[s] Canada to contribute
its expertise and promote best regulatory practices internationally, thus influencing
standards elsewhere.”
For these reasons, the CDSR and the Guidelines encourage Canadian federal government
departments and agencies to:
1. take international regulatory cooperation (IRC) into account throughout the entire
life cycle of regulation, including development, implementation, evaluation, and
review;
2. think strategically about how IRC can assist in achieving regulatory outcomes;
3. establish regulatory compatibility as a goal for regulators to achieve through the
design of regulations and through ongoing regulatory cooperation activities with
key international counterparts;
4. actively consider IRC in the ongoing management of regulatory programs and
5. regularly assess the effectiveness of their IRC activities
Most importantly, the Guidelines create a presumption in favour of international regulation,
which is phrased in the following terms: “[while] it is recognized that there are cases where
the pursuit of sound policy objectives may require unique Canadian standards or
regulations … a clear rationale for this unique approach must be evident in the regulatory
analysis.”53
At the same time, nothing in either the CDSR or the Guidelines requires Canadian
departments and agencies to automatically regulate according to international regulations.54
Instead, the Guidelines only speak of “cooperation” and set out considerations in choosing
partners for regulatory activity. These are Canada’s existing partners in North America (the
United States, Mexico) and the European Union. The rest of the world receives little
reference. Emerging and expanding economies are identified as the BRIC countries (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) and here regulatory cooperation is phrased in defensive terms: it
“should be geared to ensuring that Canadian receive adequate protections on the products
imported from these countries and that Canadian products, services, and investors have
ready access to these emerging markets.”55 The Guidelines also recognize the dual nature
of international regulation, informing Canadian regulatory practice and outcomes while
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also enhancing Canada’s “leadership role” in international regulatory efforts.56
It seems clear from the Guidelines that compatibility with international regulations in
Canada is something that the Canadian government now prioritizes, yet the absence of an
explicit “trade effects” test is notable. In this respect, the CDSR and Guidelines present an
alternative vision to that of the TED. The Guidelines make clear that achieving regulatory
harmonization is what is important. There is a belief in the validity of existing international
regulations and a subsisting desire to align with them. Canadian ‘variants’ are to be avoided
unless necessary.
The TM might usefully employ a similar methodology in its assessment of RTAs. For
example, an RTA might be assessed to the extent that it departs from internationally
accepted regulations or, where some numeric assessment is required, from an average
calculated among the WTO membership. This kind of measurement is already employed in
WTO trade negotiations on such subjects as tariffs and negotiating coefficients.57 A focus
on more than simply numbers would have the added benefit of drawing attention away
from numerical targets and of reaffirming that much of the benefit that arises from
international trade is, in fact, incalculable.
V. CONCLUSION
The TM is the latest phase in efforts to bring transparency and consistency to the treatment
of RTAs in WTO law. Uniformity is to be welcomed, but there are, as seen, many obstacles
to its successful operation, not the least of which is the willingness of countries to provide
the necessary information. It is too soon to tell if the difficulties it has experienced to date
are simply teething problems or something more serious.
In at least one respect, the accrual of information in the TM database and its comparability
should help to move the question of developing disciplines for RTAs forward by
emphasizing inconsistencies between RTAs. The comparison will furnish some idea of
what the degree of inconsistency should be. At the same time, as noted, it would be unwise
to measure those differences in a purely quantitative way. Strictly quantitative analysis is
likely to provoke invidious comparisons and poison the negotiating atmosphere.
Techniques developed in RIA that involve regulatory harmonization and the justification of
deviating measures may ultimately be of greater assistance in this regard.

56
57

Ibid.
See for instance NAMA Chair Floats Ideas to Break Logjam; U.S. Signals Flexibility, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (February 29, 2008).

